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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)
SUBJECT: CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER ON ARUSHA MEETING

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lucy Tamlyn for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Chad Foreign Minister Allam-mi stressed to Charge that Chad would do all it could to ensure a successful meeting in Arusha. Referring to Embassy demarches concerning the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's aborted meeting in Mombasa, he stated that Chad did not want to have a bilateral discussion with the United States and CHD on Darfur; all efforts needed to be conducted under the AU/UN umbrella. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) The Charge d'Affaires met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, July 24 at his request. Foreign Minister Allam-mi wanted to revisit the Embassy request on behalf of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue that Chad allow Sudan rebels to depart for Mombasa via Abeche (eastern Chad). (Note: Minister Allam-mi was not in N'Djamena during the time of the original request. End note).

¶3. (C) Foreign Minister Allam-mi started off by claiming that there were no Sudan rebels in Chad other than some who are here for medical reasons. He said that Chad had "sent all of the SLM" to Asmara; the JEM had all gone to Tripoli -- with the exception of Khalil who might still be in Darfur. If the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue wanted to organize rebel commanders for a meeting, they should ask the UN and the African Union (AU) to pick them up in Darfur and transport them where needed. He said that he had asked the Chadian security agency (ANS) where the rebels were and the ANS confirmed that the commanders were all deep in Darfur. In any event, he had asked UN negotiator Jan Eliasson about the CHD meeting while in Tripoli and Eliasson had told him that the CHD initiative was overtaken by events.

¶4. (C) Allam-mi wanted to emphasize that Chad subscribed to the Tripoli consensus and UN/AU leadership on all initiatives; they did not want to be out "conducting a bilateral discussion with the United States and the CHD on Darfur." He acknowledged that CHD had played a constructive role in earlier negotiations, but stressed that all efforts were now bent on ensuring the success of the August 1-3 meeting in Arusha, including getting all of the Sudanese rebel factions there "and in good humor." Chadian Ambassador Baharadine Haroun Brahim was organizing the Chadian side. (Comment: Baharadine has been closely involved in Chad negotiations on Darfur for a number of years and was recently named Chadian Ambassador to Khartoum.) Allam-mi stated that his major concern was Eritrea -- Chad wanted peace for its own sake; Eritrea, on the other hand, was involved because it was playing a game and saw opportunities for political leverage. He said that there were currently five Sudanese elements in Asmara (but even if these did not go to Arusha, they were represented by others.) However, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim could still be a problem. He commented that Khalil needed to "play the game."

¶5. (C) As for the next step, Allam-mi thought that Tripoli would be the best location for a meeting at the end of

August. Libya knew the players, and had ways to pressure them. According to Allam-mi, the rebels needed to accept a "Darfur-Darfur" dialogue going forward. The military leaders could not claim to be the only representatives of the people of Darfur. Their political leaders and civil society members in Sudan and abroad needed to plot the course forward and legitimize the Abuja accord.

Comment:

¶6. (C) Among Chadian officials, Allam-mi seems particularly keen to avoid displeasing Qaddafi. From Chad's perspective, it may be smart not to take on any new baggage regarding the Darfur rebels (whom Chad has a long history of aiding and abetting). Chad probably sees its interests currently best served by not annoying Libya or Sudan - with whom its relationship is now relatively good (Libya) and relatively "less-bad" (Sudan).

¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
TAMLYN